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Bringing Section 8 Home: An Argument for
Recognizing a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in
Metadata Collected from Smart Home Devices
Ana Qarri*
Abstract
Internet of Things devices (also known as smart home devices) are a fast-growing
trend in consumer home electronics. The information collected from these devices
could prove very useful to law enforcement investigations. These individual pieces of
metadata — the collection of which might appear harmless on its face — can be
highly revealing when combined with other metadata or information otherwise
available to law enforcement. This article builds an argument in favour of
recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy in metadata collected from smart
home devices under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. This
article presents a two-step argument in favour of recognizing the collection of smart
home metadata as a ‘‘search” under section 8. First, it builds on case law on house
perimeter searches to argue that — in the case of smart home devices — the
collection implicates both territorial and informational privacy interests. Second,
the article argues that metadata, on their own, are pieces of information that attract
a reasonable expectation of privacy. R. v. Spencer1 was not the final word on the
question of inferences. Several section 8 cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo2 decision, point to the willingness of
courts to engage with the complex topic of data processing. They also point to the
need to return to the values that underlie section 8 of the Charter with the goal of
clarifying its approach to predictions and probabilities as information outcomes
that deserve constitutional protection.

INTRODUCTION
The home has traditionally attracted high levels of protection from state
interference. Entick v. Carrington,3 decided in 1765, is the first dispute in the
common law that implicated privacy interests in the home. Three Messengers to
the King forcefully entered the home of John Entick, a political dissident, to seize
his writings. Entick’s action against the Messengers defined the reach of
executive power in the common law tradition, but the judgment also recognized
that trespass into Entick’s home was an infringement of liberty. 4 The status of
*
1
2
3
4

Ana Qarri is a JD/BCL (2021) candidate at the McGill University Faculty of Law.
R. v. Spencer, 2014 SCC 43, 2014 CarswellSask 342, 2014 CarswellSask 343 (S.C.C.).
R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, 2017 CarswellOnt 12187 (Ont. C.A.).
Entick v. Carrington, [1765] EWHC K.B. J98.
See ibid. There is not, as expected, an explicit mention of privacy in the decision. The
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the home as a place free from government interference remains a foundational
principle of constitutional privacy.5 The home — a place where individuals
engage in intimate and personal activities — attracts a heightened expectation of
privacy.6 The Supreme Court has established a presumption of a subjective
expectation of privacy in the home.7
Police powers to enter and search the home and its perimeter are heavily
curtailed.8 However, advancements in surveillance technologies allow police to
‘‘see” inside a home without entering. The home has become more visible to the
outside world as its residents increasingly interact with devices connected to the
internet. In the early days of the internet, the mainstay was a desktop computer
that connected the home’s residents with a global information system. Today,
consumers can purchase ‘‘Internet of Things” (IoT)9 devices for their home. The
introduction of IoT devices in the consumer market poses new challenges for
domestic privacy.10

5

6

7

8

9

10

challenged conduct is the royal messengers’ entry into Entick’s home and seizure of
writings. Lord Camden writes that if this type of executive order is ‘‘held to be legal, the
liberty of this country is at an end.”
Tipper McEwan, ‘‘Pulling the Ivy out of the Windows: Presumptions of Privacy in the
Home and R v. Gomboc” (2010) 19 Dal J Leg Stud 83 at 89; Lorne Neudorf, “Home
Invasion by Regulation: Truckers and Reasonable Expectations of Privacy under
Section 8 of the Charter” (2012) 45:2 UBC L Rev 551 at 568.
Richard Jochelson & David Ireland, Privacy in Peril: Hunter v Southam and the Drift
from Reasonable Search Protections (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2019) at 47.
See R. v. Patrick, 2009 SCC 17, 2009 CarswellAlta 481, 2009 CarswellAlta 482 (S.C.C.) at
para. 19 [Patrick]. See also R. v. Tessling, 2004 SCC 67, 2004 CarswellOnt 4351, 2004
CarswellOnt 4352 (S.C.C.) [Tessling] at para. 38 (‘‘. . .it may be presumed unless the
contrary is shown in a particular case that information about what happens inside the
home is regarded by the occupants as private. Such an expectation is rooted in the ancient
law of trespass and finds its modern justification in the intimacies of personal and family
life”).
Neudorf, supra note 5 at 568, citing R. v. Feeney, 1997 CarswellBC 1015, 1997
CarswellBC 1016, 146 D.L.R. (4th) 609, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 (S.C.C.), reconsideration /
rehearing granted 1997 CarswellBC 3179, 1997 CarswellBC 3180 (S.C.C.) (‘‘Section 8
generally prohibits warrantless police searches of dwelling homes, with the exception of
cases in which the police are in ‘hot pursuit’ of a suspect who slips into a residence”).
The term ‘‘Internet of Things” (IoT) includes all devices that can communicate with
other objects and the internet: Patricia Moloney Figliola, ‘‘The Internet of Things:
Frequently Asked Questions” (13 October 2015), online (pdf): Congressional Research
Service <crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44227/11>. See also Broadband
Internet Technical Advisory Group, ‘‘Internet of Things (IoT) Security and Privacy
Recommendations” (November 2016) at i, online (pdf): BITAG <bitag.org/reportinternet-of-things-security-privacy-recommendations.php> and Sarah Villeneuve &
Stephanie Fielding, ‘‘Data Never Sleeps: Data Collection Practices in Domestic Spaces”
(12 November 2019), online (blog): Brookfield Institute <brookfieldinstitute.ca/datanever-sleeps-data-collections-practices-in-domestic-spaces/>.
See Section IA (IoT Infrastructure is Vulnerable to Surveillance Tools), infra.

BRINGING SECTION 8 HOME

459

Section 811 jurisprudence has not grappled directly with the constitutionality
of the collection of metadata from IoT devices inside the home by law
enforcement. This article does not address the manner of collection — it does not
consider how third-party disclosure or control shapes this analysis. Instead, its
focus is on a home-dweller’s privacy interest in the metadata of their domestic
IoT devices.
I argue that law enforcement collection of metadata from domestic IoT
devices — whether through the cooperation of third parties or independently —
attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy. Two arguments support this
conclusion. First, section 8 jurisprudence on perimeter searches suggests that
concerns about police proximity to house property lines are best understood as a
concern for protecting residents from observations that invade the informational
privacy interest engaged by their home activities. Therefore, when law
enforcement use surveillance tools to collect data from home IoT devices, the
subjective expectation of privacy related to the home is activated even if they do
so from a considerable physical distance. It is the intimate nature of domestic
activities, not the physical point of data collection, that matters for the purposes
of a section 8 analysis. Second, the Supreme Court’s focus on strong and clear
inferences in R. v. Spencer12 must be reassessed with an eye to the purposive
reading of section 8: courts must become more comfortable engaging with
predictions and probabilities used by law enforcement as informational
outcomes that attract constitutional protection under the Charter. Doing so is
crucial for the protection of privacy within the homes of individuals. The
information collected by law enforcement, like heat maps or electricity usage,
may not reveal much when taken alone. However, this data collection, when
combined with other information or if inputted into predictive analytics models,
has the potential to reveal much more than is first obvious.

(a) IoT Infrastructure is Vulnerable to Surveillance Tools
IoT devices are physical devices connected to the internet or another
network.13 Some popular examples include smart sensors, cameras, and
thermostats.14 However, devices like smart ovens, fridges, toasters, and even
utensils have gained popularity in the Canadian market.15 A 2019 consumer
trends study found that a third of Canadians own at least one IoT device. 16
11

12
13
14
15
16

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 8, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
Supra note 1.
See supra note 9.
Ibid.
See Villeneuve & Fielding, supra note 9.
‘‘Canadians on Smart Home Tech: Skeptical at First, Hooked Afterwards” (23 October
2019), online: Newswire <newswire.ca/news-releases/canadians-on-smart-home-techhesitant-at-first-hooked-afterwards-875438829.html>.
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Smart devices record, create, and transmit data through the internet to other
devices and to the servers or applications of the companies that manufacture
them.17 Smart devices that adapt and react to the home environment (i.e., learn
from the events of use) collect time-sensitive data. Time-sensitive data collection
gives away to large-scale data analytics, which aim to improve the overall
functioning of the devices.18 The breadth of data recorded by IoT devices gives
rise to useful applications, such as tracking epidemics or overseeing large
infrastructure.19 At the same time, IoT devices allow data aggregation to a level
‘‘only written about in science fiction novels.”20 IoT infrastructure, still in the
early stages of global implementation, remains vulnerable to security breaches
and interferences from actors outside a user’s home.21
This article focuses on IoT devices that do not collect obviously personal
information. For example, the discussion here is not directly applicable to
wearable technology or smart speakers. Instead, the more innocuous uses of
smart home devices — fridges, locks, ovens, thermostats, smart electrical meters
— are the context with which I am concerned. These devices create metadata as a
by-product of their use.22 The metadata created can be detailed and highly
revealing, although they may appear meaningless when taken individually. 23
Data on how often law enforcement bodies request access to metadata from
smart devices is not available, as far as my research indicates. However, metadata
from smart home devices has been used to convict individuals in some cases.
Police have sought data from IoT devices like Echo, FitBit, and Nest to resolve
investigations.24 The next section situates this type of police conduct in the
Canadian constitutional context.

17

18
19

20
21

22

23
24

Patrick McFadin, ‘‘Internet of Things: Where Does the Data Go?” (2018), online: Wired
; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘‘The Internet of Things: An
Introduction to Privacy Issues with a Focus on the Retail and Home Environments”
(February 2016), online (pdf): Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
<priv.gc.ca/media/1808/iot_201602_e.pdf> [OPC, Privacy Issues].
McFadin, supra note 17.
Marie-Helen Maras & Adam Scott Wandt, ‘‘Enabling Mass Surveillance: Data
Aggregation in the Age of Big Data and the Internet of Things” (2019) 4:2 J Cyber
Policy 160.
Ibid.
Lily Hay Newman, ‘‘Critical Flaws in Millions of IoT Devices May Never Get Fixed” (8
December 2020), online: Wired <https://www.wired.com/story/amnesia33-iot-vulnerabilitiesmay-never-get-fixed/>.
Nader R Hasan, ‘‘Searching the Digital Divide” in Gerald Chan and Nader R Hasan,
eds, Digital Privacy: Criminal, Civil and Regulatory Litigation (Toronto: LexisNexis,
2018) at 11 [Nader, Digital Divide].
OPC, Privacy Issues, supra note 17.
Zack Whittaker, ‘‘Smart Home Tech Makers Don’t Want to Say if Feds Come for Your
Data” (19 October 2018), online: TechCrunch <techcrunch.com/2018/10/19/smarthome-devices-hoard-data-government-demands/>.
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PART I: COLLECTION OF METADATA FROM SMART HOME
DEVICES AMOUNTS TO A SECTION 8 ‘‘SEARCH”
IoT metadata contains a wealth of information that may be relevant to police
investigations. The examples shared above — data collected by wearable device
— attract high informational sensitivity. However, we can imagine hypotheticals
of police looking for signs of human presence in a dwelling, or strange patterns of
appliance and electricity use that may lead to a reasonable ground to believe
individuals are carrying out illegal activities. These may be data points that are
helpful when connected with other information that the police have or can
observe legitimately, without the need to acquire prior judicial authorization
through a warrant.25 I argue that collection of these types of metadata engage an
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.26
To determine whether state conduct amounts to a violation of section 8
rights, courts first consider whether there has been a search or seizure. If so, the
court must determine whether the search or seizure was unreasonable.27
Generally, this means that even if state conduct amounts to a search within
the meaning of section 8, a search conducted through lawful means (such as a
warrant or production order) is ‘‘reasonable.” The practical implication of
recognizing this form of metadata collection as a search is that police will be
required to acquire prior judicial authorization. This mechanism creates a safety
valve between an individual’s privacy interest and law enforcement.
My argument focuses exclusively on whether metadata collection from smart
home devices comprises a search under section 8. In order for police conduct to
amount to a search under section 8, the individual must hold a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the contents of the search.28
The Supreme Court of Canada has taken a normative approach to the
reasonable expectation of privacy analysis.29 To determine whether the police
conduct attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy, a contextual inquiry into
the ‘‘totality of circumstances of a particular case” is undertaken. 30 Four lines of
inquiry guide this analysis31:
25

26
27

28

29

30
31

Such a warrant may be issued under the authority of section 487 of the Criminal Code,
RSC 1985, c C-46.
Charter, supra note 11.
Department of Justice, ‘‘Section 8 — Search and Seizure” (last modified 8 June 2020),
online: Charterpedia <justice.gc.ca/eng/csj-sjc/rfc-dlc/ccrf-ccdl/check/art8.html>
[Charterpedia, section 8].
Ibid. See also Kent Roach & Robert J Sharpe, The Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 6th ed
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017) at 311 — 317.
Steven Penney, ‘‘The Digitization of Section 8 of the Charter: Reform or Revolution?”
(2014) 67:16 SCLR 505 at 519.
Ibid.
Spencer, supra note 1 at para 18.
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i. The nature of the subject matter of the search;
ii. The individual’s direct interest in the contents of the search;
iii. Whether the subject had a subjective expectation of privacy;
iv. Whether the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable.
This inquiry aims to assess whether the subject has an objective (reasonable)
expectation of privacy. While the Court has, in the most recent section 8
jurisprudence, followed this order of analysis, the goal remains to assess the
‘‘totality of the circumstances.”32 It is in the last line of inquiry — assessing
whether the subjective expectation of privacy was objectively reasonable — that
careful regard is given to the ‘‘totality of the circumstances.”33
In cases related to smart home devices, the analysis of factors ii and iii will be
straightforward. The resident of a home from which police collects IoT metadata
will have a direct interest in the contents of that data — the information is not
about a third party and is directly related to the residents.34 The Court has also
held that a subjective expectation of privacy can be presumed with regards to
activities taking place in the home.35 Smart home devices are evidently used
inside the home. By their very design, smart home devices collect information
about activities taking place inside the home. Notwithstanding an unusual
contractual and regulatory matrix, residents will have a subjective expectation of
privacy in the data collected and created by the device.
My arguments focus on two aspects of the ‘‘search” inquiry: the nature of the
subject matter of the search and whether the subjective expectation of privacy
was objectively reasonable. I outline the relevant aspect of each factor below.

(a) The Subject Matter of the Alleged Search
The Court has taken a ‘‘broad and functional approach” to this line of
inquiry.36 First, the Court has recognized that identifying the subject matter of
the search requires looking beyond a narrow consideration of the physical space
or the physical acts involved. Instead, the subject matter of the search is
identified with an eye to the ‘‘privacy interests potentially compromised.” 37
Spencer built on this rejection of a narrow analysis of the subject matter of the
alleged search. Justice Cromwell (writing for the majority) noted that the inquiry
to define the subject matter looks not only at the ‘‘precise information sought,”
but also at the ‘‘nature of the information it tends to reveal.” 38 The inquiry into
the privacy interest compromised depends on elements such as the privacy of the
32

33
34
35
36
37
38

R. v. Mills, 2019 SCC 22, 2019 CarswellNfld 161, 2019 CarswellNfld 162 (S.C.C.) at para.
13 [Mills].
Ibid.
Charterpedia, Section 8, supra note 27.
Patrick, supra note 7 at para 37.
Spencer, supra note 1 at para 26.
Ibid. at para 31.
Ibid. at para 26.
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place or thing searched and ‘‘the impact of the search on the target.”39 The
subject matter analysis, as defined to date, requires understanding i) the privacy
interests at stake and ii) what information tends to be revealed by the
information sought or collected.

(i) Whether the subject’s subjective expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable
This last step in the ‘‘search” inquiry is a normative question and not a
descriptive one.40 The question is in what contexts ‘‘Canadians ought to expect
privacy,” or, in other words, in what contexts Canadians ought to expect security
against unreasonable search.41 To determine whether someone ought to expect
privacy in a given situation, this part of the inquiry considers a non-exhaustive
list of factors.42 The most salient factors are identified depending on the facts of
the case. In cases related to police collection or capture of information about the
house that is also under the control of third parties, three factors are usually
considered43:
1. Place of the search;
2. Whether the search reveals details about the lifestyle of the person or
details that are intimate;
3. Whether the information was already in the hands of third parties; if so,
whether it is subject to an obligation of confidentiality
For the purposes of this article, two factors are significant: place of search,
and the ability to reveal details about lifestyle. The article proceeds by discussing
first the privacy interests at stake, with an emphasis on the role of the home as a
locus of heightened privacy. The role of inferences in defining the subject matter
and the reasonable expectation of privacy is then considered in Part III.

PART II: TERRITORIAL AND INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY ARE
OVERLAPPING INTERESTS IN HOME-RELATED SEARCHES
Section 8 protects at least three privacy interests: personal privacy, territorial
privacy and informational privacy.44 These categories serve as an analytical tool
to determine the nature of the subject matter of the search and to aid the
contextual analysis of the objective reasonability inquiry. These categories of
privacy interest can overlap.

39
40
41
42
43

44

Patrick, supra note 7 at para 32; Spencer, supra note 1 at para 36.
Mills, supra note 32 at para 20.
Ibid.
Nader, Digital Divide, supra note 22.
See generally R. v. Gomboc, 2010 SCC 55, 2010 CarswellAlta 2269, 2010 CarswellAlta
2270 (S.C.C.) [Gomboc]; R. v. Orlandis-Habsburgo, 2017 ONCA 649, 2017 CarswellOnt
12187 (Ont. C.A.) [Orlandis-Habsburgo].
Gomboc, supra note 43 at para 19.
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On a purposive view, section 8 protects ‘‘people, not places”45; however, the
well-established principle of one’s dwelling as a place that attracts heightened
expectations of privacy acknowledges the reality that many activities pursued
inside the home engage both territorial and informational privacy interests. The
Court has consistently recognized the overriding constitutional importance of the
privacy interests connected to activities engaged in within the home. 46 In
Tessling, Binnie J. explained that state power to see inside our dwelling must be
more limited relative to other locations because ‘‘the home is where our most
intimate and personal activities are most likely to take place.” 47
The collection of metadata from smart home devices engages both territorial
and informational privacy interests. This is true even if the police do not need to
enter the home to collect metadata, but do so remotely, whether in physical
proximity to one’s home or by surveying from afar. It is important to recognize
both interests independently and where they overlap.
Access to the metadata of smart home devices is an intrusion into the home
despite the absence of physical entry by law enforcement. As I argue in
subsection A (below), protecting the perimeter of dwellings — which has been
recognized to engage the territorial privacy dimension of section 8 — is also tied
to the informational privacy interest of the individual. Although the Supreme
Court has asserted that perimeter searches engage territorial privacy, I argue that
the concern at the core of these cases is also the protection of informational
privacy interests. In subsection B, I expand the boundary of inquiry by
considering cases to date that have found a reasonable expectation of privacy in
information collected about the home from outside the home. These cases have
attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy because they engage both
informational and territorial interests — both the information collected and
the nature of the place indirectly surveyed (the home) are integral to the analysis.
These elements of section 8 jurisprudence point to the significant and
overlapping interests at stake, which are of both a territorial and
informational nature. As such, the collection of metadata from IoT devices
would attract both of these privacy interests. Most significantly, the established
line of cases that limit police powers in relation to perimeter searches are
conceptually applicable to the collection of metadata from IoT devices and
should guarantee the same level of protection moving forward.

(a)

Limits on Perimeter Searches are a Proxy for Limiting Police
Observations of Activities Inside the Home

The distinction between police conduct that is and is not a violation of a
target’s territorial privacy continues to evolve.48 Police have ‘‘implied licence” to
45
46

47

Tessling, supra note 7 at para 22.
R. v. Plant, 1993 CarswellAlta 94, 1993 CarswellAlta 566, [1993] 8 W.W.R. 287, [1993] 3
S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) at para. 48 [Plant]; Tessling, supra note 7 at paras 13, 22.
Tessling, supra note 7 at para 22.
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do things such as approach the door of a home and knock to communicate with
the occupant or check in on a complaint.49 Other legitimate avenues are also
available to police, such as observing the home from the public areas around it,
noting who is entering and leaving the home, and asking neighbours for
information related to activities taking place inside.50
There are also clear examples of what police conduct constitutes a search of
the home. In Plant, the Supreme Court ruled that the police’s search of a house’s
perimeter violated section 8.51 In that case, the police walked around to the back
of the house and tampered with a vent to see what was inside. In R. v. Kokesch,
the police carried out a perimeter search without a warrant or probable
grounds.52 While doing so, ‘‘they heard electrical humming from the basement,
noticed plywood nailed to the wall of the residence covering a louvered metal
vent and, from the side of the plywood, detected an odour of marijuana as well as
heat coming from the area.”53 The Supreme Court found that the process in
which these observations were gathered violated the target’s section 8 rights.
To date, the line between what conduct related to the home violates section 8
and what does not, has been determined with an eye to the physical conduct of
the police. This means that the primary focus of these inquiries has been the
territorial privacy interest at stake. Police have a sufficiently clear directive not to
enter a target’s home without a warrant or other lawful grounds. Their ability to
conduct perimeter searches (i.e., their ability to be physically close to the home) is
similarly limited.
Novel investigative techniques, like intercepting digital signals, do not
require entry into the home to gather information about the activities inside the
home. Through different technologies, police can make observations about the
home without entering its premises or getting close to its perimeter. For example,
whether the house temperature has been adjusted, or whether an IoT-connected
toothbrush is communicating with the servers of its parent company, can result
in reliable inferences about activity (or lack thereof) inside the home.
The protection of the home through the lens of territorial privacy interests
has the purpose of protecting an individual’s privacy interest in the intimate
details that can be uncovered when the state intrudes upon the home. These cases
focus on the physical closeness of police to home in order to establish a territorial
privacy interest. However, even territorial privacy interests in these cases are
meant to protect information about people’s intimate lives, such as inferences
48

49

50
51
52
53

See e.g. Neudorf, supra note 5; see also Kent Roach & Robert J Sharpe, supra note 28 at
311 — 317.
R. v. MacDonald, 2014 SCC 3, 2014 CarswellNS 16, 2014 CarswellNS 17 (S.C.C.) at
para. 26; Jochelson & Ireland, supra note 6 at 47.
Gomboc, supra note 43 at para 47.
Supra note 46.
R. v. Kokesch, 1990 CarswellBC 255, 1990 CarswellBC 763, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 3 (S.C.C.).
Ibid.
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that police can make from peering through windows, looking inside vents, or
smelling what is going on inside the home.
These perimeter search cases are not about identifying the physical space that
police can occupy in relation to the home, and they are not about property lines.
Instead, they are about the physical proximity that allows police to make clear
observations and collect information that strongly reveals what is happening
inside the home. In other words, the closer police get to the interior of the home,
the closer they get to infringing upon detailed and intimate information about
someone’s life.

(b) Collection of Information about the Home from Outside the Home is
Protected by Section 8
Section 8 protects territorial privacy in the home and guarantees a
presumption of a subjective expectation of privacy about what goes on inside
our homes.54 If police access metadata from smart home devices without entering
the home, they are still engaging the target’s territorial privacy interest. The
access to data created and communicated by smart home devices attracts the
same type of privacy interest as has been engaged in cases where police have used
technologies to carry out external collection of specific types of observations and
measurements related to events taking place inside the home.
For example, in R. v. Tessling, the RCMP used a Forward Looking InfraRed (FLIR) camera to capture images of thermal energy radiating from the
accused’s building.55 The Supreme Court found that the privacy interest was
primarily informational, but also implicated territorial privacy. 56 In Tessling, the
RCMP did not enter the accused’s home; however, the information the RCMP
was seeking was about activities taking place in the home.57 The Supreme Court
held that the RCMP’s actions implicated the accused’s territorial privacy interest.
The issue at bar was whether the thermal energy radiation recordings
revealed any intimate details about the target’s life. The Supreme Court was clear
that the use of the FLIR did not implicate the same extent of intrusion as an
entry into the home by police. The Supreme Court recognized that the data
collected implicated territorial privacy by looking into the home in a very specific
way but held that it was mainly a matter of informational privacy. However, the
recognition that it implicated territorial privacy points to conceptualizing the use
of a surveillance technique that collects information about events taking place
inside the home as territorial intrusion. This was the case even though the
collection was technically achieved from outside the house.
In Tessling, the information collected by the FLIR did not already exist in a
readable format. It was created by the FLIR, or rather it was ‘‘read” by it. In
54
55
56
57

Patrick, supra note 7.
Tessling, supra note 7.
Ibid. at para 24.
Ibid.
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contrast, smart home metadata already exists and can give way to even more
detailed observations than those in Tessling. Smart home devices collect detailed
information that tracks events, changes, and interactions in the home. Collecting
metadata from smart home devices would allow the police to ‘‘see” inside the
home with much clearer vision than in Tessling. Perimeter search case law limits
how close the police can get to observe the home. Section 8 jurisprudence
recognizes the risk that this conduct causes to privacy interests. Applying this
principle to smart home devices means that the police’s ability to see inside the
home should be equally limited even if they are not seeing in the physical sense.
This kind of search goes beyond the acceptable avenues that police are currently
granted to observe the home during criminal investigations.
In R. v. Gomboc, a digital recording ammeter (DRA) was installed on the
power line connected to the house with the cooperation of the utility provider. 58
The DRA recorded hourly usage data which enabled police to make a ‘‘strong
inference” that the pattern matched that of a grow-op.59 Justice Deschamps
(writing for the majority) decided that territorial privacy was not engaged
because ‘‘the home itself was never directly the object of a search. The location
where the search took place was not the home but the transformer box where the
power lines entering the home could be accessed. After some confusion . . . about
whether the transformer was located on Mr. Gomboc’s property, it was common
ground before this Court that it was not. Accordingly, no direct territorial
privacy interest is engaged in this case.”60 Further, Deschamps J. noted that the
search was ‘‘non-invasive and unintrusive” as it did not require entering the
home.61 Deschamps J.’s judgment in Gomboc assesses the severity of the
intrusion by relying heavily on the physical intrusion of the police in relation to
the home. The point where the data is collected (by the DRA, outside the home)
is considered a key reason for why the expectation of privacy is not heightened,
despite the fact that the home is involved.
In the context of smart home devices, however, Gomboc is easily
distinguishable. Unlike the DRA, which was placed outside property lines,
smart home devices are always inside the home. This means that the data is
created and collected inside the home. Should police wish to access them, their
conduct would involve intercepting the metadata’s flow directly between the
device and the network it is plugged into. Alternatively, police could access the
metadata by requesting the information from a third-party manufacturer. As
such, the principle from Gomboc that the collection is taking place outside the
home does not apply. Even if there exists a hypothetical situation where it does
apply, I have argued that the collection of metadata from smart home devices
engages overlapping informational and territorial privacy interests. As a result,
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collecting the metadata would attract the heightened protection of privacy that
the home usually attracts.
The Supreme Court’s decisions to date on information collected about the
home with the use of advanced digital surveillance techniques that do not require
entry have failed to draw a clear conceptual line that clarifies the connection
between territorial and informational privacy interests. There will hopefully be
occasions for courts to spell out this relationship in future cases. The distinction
between the interior and exterior of a home is based on an assessment of police
capabilities that precedes the kinds of surveillance, interception, and digital
technologies that law enforcement uses today. Courts should be guided by the
principle established in section 8 jurisprudence that searches in which the home is
the object of the search attract a heightened expectation of privacy due to both
the territorial nature of home privacy and the sensitive nature of the
informational privacy interest engaged.

PART III: INFERENTIAL CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION MUST
BE CONSIDERED WHEN DETERMINING THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
SEARCH
The strength of correlations or inferences that police can make based on the
information collected or captured is at the core of the reasonable expectation of
privacy analysis in Plant, Tessling, and Gomboc. The case law focuses on how
clear the inference is or what the data can reveal about the individual’s personal
activities and intimate life. It is the information that is revealed, and not the
information collected, that must attract a privacy interest for the individual to
secure section 8 standing. Courts must acknowledge today’s technological
realities when determining the type of information that innocuous metadata can
reveal and engage with predictions and probabilities as information that goes to
the biographical core for the purposes of section 8. If courts do not take notice of
these realities, large parts of individuals’ personal lives will lose constitutional
privacy protection.
IoT metadata, combined with the increasingly strong inferential capabilities
of new technology, complicates this analysis. Any given piece of metadata could
be combined with another piece of previously known information such that it
gives rise to new information. For example, a recent study found that external
parties could use metadata about the traffic of encrypted (unreadable)
information to ‘‘infer, in real time, that a specific interaction . . . is occurring
between the user and a smart [device].”62 We can imagine this information being
about any device in someone’s home, including devices that may be particularly
private and interact with someone’s most intimate activities. In addition to
connections between IoT metadata and other sets of information, police can use
predictive technologies that use these data as input to output inferences and
62
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probabilistic information.63 Although they may not guarantee absolute certainty,
smart home devices in combination with other tools available to law enforcement
are powerful inferential instruments that can reveal intimate details about
someone’s life.

(a) Spencer was not the Final Word on the Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy in Inferences Made from Collected Data
When defining the subject matter of the search, courts must inquire beyond
the nature of the precise information sought to the nature of information a
search reveals.64 In the context of smart home devices, this means that, while
information about when and how many times someone uses their air conditioner
or toothbrush might not appear highly revealing of their biographical core, the
information that metadata from smart home devices is likely to reveal could
infringe on the individual’s privacy interest.
In Spencer, the Supreme Court looked beyond the specific information
collected. It focused on the information that the police planned to access and the
privacy interests that the resulting information engaged. For example, in
Spencer, ‘‘the subject matter of the search was not simply a name and address . . .
it was the identity of an Internet subscriber which corresponded to particular
Internet usage.”65 The Court recognized that Spencer’s ‘‘specific online
activities” were what the police were really seeking.66
Spencer involved a clear, one-step link between the original information
(subscriber information) and the inference (history of online activity). The police
were able to input the seemingly innocuous information into a database. This
allowed them to unlock detailed information about Spencer’s subscriber history.
When deciding what information is revealed by data points such as electrical
consumption records, or an IP address and name, the Supreme Court has looked
for a clear link between one piece of information and the resulting piece of
information. In Spencer, the clear link was found. In previous cases, like Plant
and Gomboc, the link was not as clear: it required police to compare the
information about other data sets and to make ‘‘informed predictions” [emphasis
in original].67
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The Supreme Court’s reliance on ‘‘strength” and ‘‘certainty” is not easily
reconciled with the types of metadata that smart home devices often collect and
communicate. Metadata can be meaningless on their own but can be very
revealing when placed in context with other metadata or analyzed with other
known patterns.68 Spencer did not remedy the focus on the strength of inferences,
since in that case the link between the IP address, name, and subscriber history
was conclusive. It was less of an inference and more like a missing link that gave
the police access to verifiable and certain information. The framework for
assessing whether raw data that gives way to information about an individual’s
life can itself attract a reasonable expectation of privacy remains to be decided.

(b) Section 8 Does Not Protect only ‘‘Strong” Inferences
The cases decided before Spencer took different and confusing approaches to
the treatment of information that can reveal other information that in turn
attracts a reasonable expectation of privacy. These examples show a Supreme
Court divided on how to understand information that is not itself revelatory of
personal details. The information collected in these cases requires some type of
processing in order to be useful to police. The process of taking data points,
combining them with other points, and reaching new conclusions or educated
prediction about actions, surroundings, or behaviour has not been addressed
directly by the Supreme Court in these cases.69
For example, in Plant, there was disagreement about the relationship
between electrical consumption data and intimate details. Sopinka J. (writing for
the majority) held that there was no link between the electrical consumption
information and intimate details about the residents’ life. McLachlin J. (as she
then was) dissented on this point, arguing that ‘‘[t]he very reason the police
wanted [the electricity consumption records at issue] was to learn about the
appellant’s personal lifestyle, i.e. the fact that he was growing marihuana”
[emphasis added].70 In Tessling, Binnie J. (writing for the majority) held that the
FLIR data provided ‘‘meaningless” information. The information was
meaningless because it did not give any certain links between the FLIR data
and the activities inside the home.71 Instead, the FLIR data supported ‘‘a
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number of hypotheses including as one possibility the existence of a marijuana
grow-op” [emphasis added].72
In Gomboc, the Court was divided on how to conceptualize what information
could be revealed by data on electricity consumption. Deschamps J. (writing for
the majority) took a narrow view. She focused on ‘‘the degree to which the DRA
data reveals private information”73 and concluded that such data ‘‘reveals
nothing about the intimate or core personal activities of the occupants. It reveals
nothing but one particular piece of information: the consumption of
electricity.”74 In her concurring opinion, Abella J. argued that the DRA,
which measured minute-by-minute electrical consumption data points, yielded
‘‘usually reliable inferences as to the presence within the home of one particular
activity.”75 McLachlin C.J. and Fish J. in their dissent argued that ‘‘the fruits of
a search need not produce conclusive determinations about activities within a home
in order to be considered informative and thus intrusive” [emphasis added]. 76

(c) Section 8 Protects People from Unreasonable State Intrusion, not from
Perfect Predictive Power
The treatment of inferences in these cases indicates both confusion and
division among the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court in Spencer did not have
the opportunity to address issues of possibilities, inconclusive determination, or
other points of contention from these judgments. Instead, Spencer sets a strong
foundation for protecting information with inferential capabilities, whether on
its own or in combination with other data. Its interpretation in the future must
not be limited to clear-cut cases.
Others have argued that metadata collected from IoT devices should be
treated similarly to the heat-based data in Tessling or the electricity consumption
data in Gomboc.77 Lee-Ann Conrod, for example, argues that this should be so,
in part by characterizing smart home devices like a fridge or a lightbulb as a
‘‘dumb device” since it does not reveal ‘‘a massive amount of information” about
the user on its own.78 She argues that ‘‘any search to obtain data from a dumb
device would be minimally intrusive, specific, and have pinpoint accuracy”. 79
72
73
74
75
76
77

78

Tessling, supra note 7 at para 53.
Gomboc, supra note 43 at para 6.
Ibid. at para 14.
Ibid. at para 81.
Ibid. at para 123.
Lee-Ann Conrod, “Smart Devices in Criminal Investigations: How Section 8 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms Can Better Protect Privacy in the Search of
Technology and Seizure of Information” (2019) 24 Appeal 115 at 128 (‘‘I would imagine
that the SCC would treat this type of technology much like they did the forward looking
infrared (‘FLIR’) or digital recording ammeter (‘DRA’). Like FLIR, the information
‘may or may not be capable of giving rise to an inference about what was actually going
on inside’”).
Ibid.

472 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

The manner in which the search is conducted is a factor in deciding whether the
search is reasonable, in later steps of the section 8 analysis. However, the fact
that this type of search would on its own be minimally intrusive compared to, for
instance, a police car sitting outside of someone’s house to determine whether
they are home does not mean that the collection of metadata is not a search.
Section 8 is technologically neutral and whether information collected from a
source about an individual amounts to a search under section 8 should not rely
on the type of device from which such information is collected.
Courts should read Spencer broadly, as an example of a strong inference that
falls under the set of situations where seemingly non-personal data has the
potential to reveal more intimate information. Spencer has already been applied
in cases related to the collection of information about the home.
Orlandis-Habsburgo, a Court of Appeal for Ontario (CAO) decision, found
that ‘‘subject matter of the search includes both the raw data and the inferences
that can be drawn from that data about the activity in the residence.” 80 Most
notably, the decisions in Orlandis-Habsburgo and R. v. Tran81 applied Spencer
and refused to follow the precedents set by Gomboc and Plant that electricity
consumption data did not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. 82 The
courts in these cases found that conclusions reached by police by comparing
electrical consumption records with grow-op consumption patterns were
informational outcomes that attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy.
This approach recognizes that, without the consumption data collected from the
home, law enforcement would not have been able to reach this conclusion. The
decisions recognize that, while the consumption data themselves may not fall
within the individual biographical core, the resulting conclusions that the police
reached did attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. The same logic should be
applied to metadata from smart home devices in future cases.
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CONCLUSION
Smart home devices implicate both territorial and informational privacy
interests. Courts should not be led astray by the intangible nature of the
collection of metadata from smart home devices. These devices are found in
people’s homes, and their seemingly innocuous metadata can be leveraged to
reveal much more sensitive information about the individual and their home.
Searches of metadata from smart home devices should be conducted with prior
judicial authorization in order to be reasonable. Police should be required to
obtain a search warrant pursuant to section 487 of the Criminal Code or a
production order pursuant to section 487.014 of the Criminal Code.
Home searches engage territorial privacy interests, which in turn protect
informational privacy interests by blocking access to where such information
may be found. Searches of smart home devices are home searches. Protection
from physical intrusion into someone’s territory in and around the home can be
translated to reflect the changing connection that networked technology
introduces between the physical interior of the home and the outside world.
Smart home devices communicate from inside the home to outside the home
without seeking constant permission to do so from the home dweller. The use of
such devices is likely to grow due to their utility and convenience. Individuals
should not lose the reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes because they
choose to introduce smart devices into these intimate spaces.
Smart home devices also engage informational privacy interests due to the
inferences and informed predictions that can be made as a result of their
metadata. Spencer and the Orlandis-Habsburgo decision are starting points that
encourage courts to engage with the complex technological reality of data
processing. Section 8 jurisprudence is still developing in its treatment of
inferences. Information that serves as the basis of inferences and predictions that
touch on the ‘‘biographical core” should be protected by section 8 even if it does
not yield perfect outputs.

